Randall Pintal v. Commissioner Social Security by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-11-2015 
Randall Pintal v. Commissioner Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Randall Pintal v. Commissioner Social Security" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 249. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/249 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3354 
_____________ 
 
RANDALL L. PINTAL, 
                                                 Appellant 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 13-cv-00127) 
District Judge:  Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2015 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 11, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 Randall Pintal appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Security Administration (“Commissioner”) finding Pintal “not disabled” under the Social 
Security Act and thus ineligible for Disability Insurance Benefits because his alcohol 
abuse was a contributing factor material to the disability determination.  We will affirm.  
I.  Background 
 Pintal brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner 
denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social 
Security Act.  42 U.S.C. § 401-33.  In his application for benefits, he alleged that, since 
June 16, 2005, he had been disabled due to bipolar disorder, a sleeping disorder, an eating 
disorder, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and depression.  An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
held a hearing at which Pintal was represented by counsel.  Pintal appeared at the hearing 
and testified on his own behalf.  A vocational expert also testified.  The ALJ decided that 
Pintal’s impairment was sufficiently severe that no jobs existed in significant numbers in 
the national economy that Pintal could perform.  The ALJ further concluded, however, 
that Pintal’s alcohol abuse was a contributing factor material to the determination of 
disability because, even though Pintal would still have several severe impairments if he 
ceased abusing alcohol, he would be able to perform a limited range of light work.  
Because the alcohol abuse was a material contributing factor, the ALJ concluded that 
Pintal was not disabled under the Social Security Act.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(c).  
 Pintal requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied his request for 
review and thus made the ALJ’s ruling the final decision of the Commissioner.  Having 
exhausted all of his administrative remedies, Pintal filed an action in the District Court, 
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.  The parties filed cross-motions for 
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summary judgment and the District Court granted the Commissioner’s motion, ruling that 
the disability decision was supported by substantial evidence.  Pintal timely appealed.   
II.  Discussion1 
 “In order to establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 
demonstrate there is some medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents 
him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month 
period.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential evaluation process to 
determine if a person is disabled.  20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).  That process requires an 
ALJ to consider whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial, gainful work activity; 
(2) has severe medical impairments; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals one of 
the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments; (4) can return to his past relevant 
work; and, if not, (5) can perform other work consistent with his residual functional 
capacity.  Id.  With respect to step three, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to determine 
medical equivalence to the listed impairments, as required by the Social Security Act.  Id. 
§ 416.926(e); Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000).  
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the Commissioner’s final determination 
of Pintal’s Social Security claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The role of this Court is identical to that of 
the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). 
“Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 
2005) (citing Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)).  In other words, it is 
“more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of evidence.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Pintal raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ erred at step three of the 
analysis in failing to secure a state agency psychological and physical assessment, (2) 
whether the ALJ erred in concluding that alcohol materially contributed to Pintal’s 
claimed disability, and (3) whether the District Court erred in “impermissibly substituting 
a more adequate and proper basis for the ALJ’s decision [and] whether the District Court 
impermissibly failed to limit review to the four corners of the ALJ’s decision.” 2  
(Opening Br. at 3.)  None of those arguments prevail.   
 A.  State Agency Psychological and Physical Assessment 
 Pintal claims that the ALJ erred in step three of her analysis by failing to obtain a 
state agency assessment.  Specifically, he argues that the 2007 state agency assessment 
prepared by state agency consultant Dr. Manella Link, Ph.D., is inadequate because, in 
2010, state agency medical consultant Dr. Sharon Becker Tarter, Ph.D., noted that there 
was insufficient evidence for the period prior to 2009 in the file.  Despite that argument, 
the ALJ’s step-three analysis is sound.  
 The ALJ is required to consider the issue of medical equivalence – that is, whether 
a claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the listed impairments under the Social 
Security Act.  If a state agency has made the initial medical assessment, an ALJ is 
required to consider that assessment as an expert medical opinion.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1527(e)(2).  To ensure that the state agency properly considers medical equivalence 
                                              
 2 Pintal actually identifies five issues for appeal, but his brief contains only three 
sections of argument, largely because some of the “issues” he lists in the statement of 
issues are the same contention stated differently: that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
alcohol abuse materially contributed to the claimed disability.  (Opening Br. at 2-3.)    
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in the first instance, it must submit documentation establishing that it has done so, 
including, among other possibilities, a psychiatric review technique form.  SSR 96-6p 
(July 2, 1996). 
 Here, as the District Court correctly noted, the record contains an assessment on a 
psychiatric review technique form from Dr. Link.  Thus, insofar as Pintal argues that 
there was no psychiatric review technique form, his claim is contradicted by the record.  
Further, Pintal neither cites to any law nor advances any argument as to why Dr. Tarter’s 
comment on the evidence in the file for the period prior to 2009 renders the 2007 
psychiatric review technique form insufficient.  The form serves as a proxy to show that 
the state agency consultant has considered the question of medical equivalence, which 
Dr. Link clearly did here.  As the District Court noted, Pintal does not argue that Dr. 
Link’s opinions are incorrect, and he relied upon them below.   
  Pintal argues that the ALJ was required to obtain an updated medical opinion 
because there was a “huge volume” of new medical evidence that was never submitted to 
a state agency, but he is mistaken.  (Opening Br. at 35.)  “Only where ‘additional medical 
evidence is received that in the opinion of the [ALJ] ... may change the State agency 
medical ... consultant’s finding that the impairment(s) is not equivalent in severity to any 
impairment in the Listing,’ is an update to the report required.”  Chandler v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration and omission in original) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting SSR 96–6p (July 2, 1996)).3   
                                              
 3 Pintal also argues that the ALJ did not consider a state agency medical 
assessment at step three.  Because he failed to raise that issue or assert any claim related 
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 B.  Whether Alcohol Contributed Materially to Pintal’s Claimed Disability 
 Pintal argues that the ALJ erred in determining that alcohol contributed to his 
claimed disability because she impermissibly ignored medical opinion evidence, failed to 
address the lay opinions of two of Pintal’s friends, and reached a conclusion that is 
contrary to the “facts.”   
 To the extent he suggests that the ALJ was obligated to obtain a medical opinion 
that decides the ultimate question, Pintal is wrong.  The ultimate legal determination of 
disability is reserved for the Commissioner.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are 
responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the 
statutory definition of disability.  In so doing, we review all of the medical findings and 
other evidence ... . A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to 
work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); see also Knepp, 204 
F.3d at 85 (“Knepp ... argues that only a physician designated by the Commissioner can 
decide the question of medical equivalency.  This argument misapprehends 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1526. The ultimate decision concerning the disability of a claimant is reserved for 
the Commissioner.” (citations omitted)).   
 Pintal also complains that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Yogesh Maru’s opinion 
that it was “difficult to tease out whether [Pintal’s] symptoms are the cause or effect of 
                                                                                                                                                  
to the combination of physical impairments below, however, he has waived it on appeal.  
See, e.g., Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 2010) (“This court has 
consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal.” (quoting Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994))).  In any 
event, the record is clear that the ALJ considered Pintal’s combination of medical 
impairments in her step three analysis.    
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alcohol.”  (Tr. at 315.)  This argument, too, is meritless.  First, an ALJ is not required to 
cite every piece of evidence in the record.  See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 
(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that there is no requirement for an ALJ to discuss or refer to every 
piece of relevant evidence in the record, so long as the reviewing court can discern the 
basis of the decision).  Second, Dr. Maru’s statement is a treatment note from the second 
day of Pintal’s five-day voluntary admission for alcohol detoxification after Pintal had 
been drinking “large quantities of alcohol almost on a daily basis” and not taking his 
prescription medication.  (Tr. at 315, 275.)  Under these circumstances, Dr. Maru might 
well have been unable to “tease out” the cause and effect of Pintal’s symptoms at that 
time.  It does not follow, however, that it was impossible to do so later.  Indeed, Dr. 
Maru’s notes upon Pintal’s discharge state that Pintal had “stabilized” and that his 
depression and anxiety had improved in the absence of alcohol.  (Tr. at 939-40, 311-313.)  
The ALJ’s conclusions are thus consistent with Dr. Maru’s notes.  Cf. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 
F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2000) (“When she rejects the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ 
must adequately explain her reasons for doing so.” (emphasis added)).  Third, the record 
indicates that the ALJ did consider Dr. Maru’s opinion, even if she did not specifically 
refer to it:  the ALJ discussed Pintal’s hospitalization and cited the exhibit containing Dr. 
Maru’s report; the ALJ noted Pintal’s complaints that appeared on Dr. Maru’s discharge 
summary report; and the ALJ noted different diagnoses that were issued by the 
emergency department provider and reviewed by Dr. Maru.   
 Pintal next contends that the ALJ did not follow certain guidelines which state 
that, “[w]hen it is not possible to separate the mental restrictions and limitations imposed 
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by [drug and alcohol abuse] and the various other mental disorders, a finding of ‘not 
material’ would be appropriate.”  (Social Security EM-96200, response to question 29) 
(App. Vol. II at 7.)  As is noted above, however, the record supports the conclusion that 
the ALJ was able to make such a determination based on the totality of the evidence, 
including Pintal’s brief period of sobriety.   
 Pintal also argues that the ALJ ignored the evidence from other medical providers 
and his friends, and that her decision was contrary to their conclusions.  A review of the 
record, however, reveals that the ALJ in fact did consider the evidence from those 
providers.  Further, contrary to Pintal’s assertions, the ALJ did consider the lay witness 
evidence provided by Pintal’s friends and indeed credited that evidence in her findings.   
 Finally, the ALJ’s decision that Pintal’s alcohol abuse is a contributing factor 
material to his disability is supported by substantial evidence.  The record, including 
reports, treatment records, Dr. Maru’s notes, and statements from Pintal’s friends, 
supports the conclusion that Pintal would be able to perform some light work if he did not 
abuse alcohol.  Pintal cites to McGill v. Commissioner of Social Security, arguing that, 
unlike the claimant in McGill, he has provided ample evidence of depression and anxiety, 
independent of alcohol.  288 F. App’x 50, 53 (3d Cir. 2009).  But he misses the point.  
The ALJ agreed that, in the absence of substance abuse,  Pintal had severe depression and 
anxiety, and yet the ALJ concluded that alcohol aggravated those conditions, rendering 
Pintal unable to perform any work available in the economy.  [Tr. at 95, 99.]  The 
treatment records and other evidence show that Pintal responded well to treatment and 
had more normal mental status examinations while sober.  For example, Pintal reported 
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no hallucinations during periods when he stopped drinking; he said that, after completing 
alcohol-related treatment, low-dose anxiety medicine helped him; and during his 
testimony before the ALJ, Pintal admitted that his increased psychiatric symptoms 
coincided with his alcohol problems and his move from Boston to Oil City, Pennsylvania.  
The ALJ’s conclusion that alcohol was a material contributing factor in Pintal’s disability 
is thus supported by substantial evidence and we are not free to disturb it.  
 C. The District Court’s Reasoning 
 Finally, Pintal takes issue with the District Court’s opinion, arguing that the Court 
erred in supplementing the ALJ’s reasoning and in not confining review to the “four 
corners of the [ALJ’s] decision.”  (Opening Br. at 30.)  We disagree. 
 Pintal’s argument that the District Court, by citing cases, “impermissibly 
supplement[ed]” the ALJ’s decision is simply mistaken.  (Opening Br. at 34.)  He seems 
to argue that, because the District Court cited to cases in explaining why it was upholding 
the ALJ’s decision, it somehow supplemented the decision.  Not surprisingly, he cites 
nothing to support the odd proposition that it is error for a district court to cite precedents, 
and we reject his contention. 
 Further, the District Court did not “impermissibly ... create and bolster a defense 
never undertaken by the ALJ.”  (Opening Br. at 38.)  Pintal relies on Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., for the proposition that the District Court was 
confined to reviewing the four corners of the ALJ’s decision.  332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) 
(court reviewing administrative agency decision must evaluate it based only the grounds 
invoked by the agency).  While we have said that a district court may not rely on 
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“medical records found in its own independent analysis ... which were not mentioned by 
the ALJ,” that is not what happened here.  Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 44 n.7.  Pintal has not 
pointed to a single piece of evidence relied upon by the District Court that was not also 
noted in some way in the ALJ’s decision.  Rather, he argues that the District Court 
supplied “missing analysis.”  (Opening Br. at 39.)  The District Court did not, however, 
affirm the ALJ for any reason extrinsic to the ALJ’s own decision and thus did not err.  In 
any event, having conducted our own de novo review of the ALJ’s decision, we conclude 
that it is supported by substantial evidence.    
III.  Conclusion 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm.  
